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In this study, we investigate the role of payoff information and conformity in improving
network performance in a traffic dilemma known as the Braess paradox. Our goal is
to understand when decisions are guided by selfish motivations or otherwise by social
ones. For this purpose, we consider the manipulation of others’ choice, public and
private monitoring and information on distribution of choices. Data show that when
social comparison was not salient, participants were more cooperative. By contrast,
cooperativeness of others’ choice made participants more competitive leading to traffic
and collective performance decrease. The implications of these findings to the literature
on social dilemmas are discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The operation of transportation and communication in modern societies relies on networks
(Rapoport et al., 2009). For this reason, the management and the improvement of such networks
are becoming essential problems in modern society. An intrinsic characteristic of these networks
is that they are the social spaces in which individuals act selfishly. Therefore, it is important to
investigate the emergence of some detrimental properties derived by individual behavioral patterns.
When considering networks, according to Rapoport et al. (2006) one of the main questions to be
addressed is how behavior adapts to changes in the network structure in decentralized systems.
Indeed, answers to this question could be interesting for both managers and scientists.
In this paper, we present a pilot study aimed to improve the network performance in the Braess
paradox (Braess, 1968). The Braess paradox is defined as the counter-intuitive phenomenon in
which the introduction of a route in a traffic network leads to a traffic increase rather than a
decrease (Braess, 1968). We conducted a pilot study to increase our understanding of whether a
social psychological perspective can help to reduce traffic in the Braess paradox. We focused our
attention on structural solutions for social dilemmas and found support for the hypothesis that
incomplete information may reduce traffic.
The paper is divided in 7 sections. In Section 2, we provide a definition of the Braess paradox
and present some instances of real life examples. In Section 3, we argue that the Braess paradox—
under a social psychology perspective—can be considered as a social dilemma and present some
variables that have been considered to tackle collective disasters in these situations. In Section 4, we
present the rationale and design of our study. In Sections 5 and 6, the methods and the results of
the experiments are presented. In Section 7, we discuss the results and provide some directions for
future research.
Romano et al. Reducing Traffic: A Pilot Study
2. THE BRAESS PARADOX
Consider a population of 8 individuals playing several rounds
in two phases: in the first phase subjects play in the so-called
basic network phase (see Figure 1A). They are asked to imagine
that they are commuters that every day (round) have to go
from the node Start to the node End in the shortest time
possible. As commuters, they can decide between two possible
routes, the first one Up consists of passing through the node
U and the second one Down consists of passing through the
node D. Both routes consist of two links, one with fixed travel
time (Start-D and U-End), and one depending on congestion
(Start-U and D-End). As it concerns the first link, travel
time is 28min, and for the second link, travel time increases
linearly with the number of commuters. In this situation, rational
commuters will equally distribute between the two routes. Thus,
the expected traffic (travel cost) for the commuters in this
situation will be about 40min. In the second phase of the
game, participants play the same type of game but with the
introduction of a third possible route derived by a link with
a constant travel time of 1min between the node U and the
node D. This phase is called the augmented network phase
(Figure 1B). Specifically, the new route is made by the nodes
Start-U-D-End: we will call this route UD. In this case, we
have a Nash equilibrium, i.e., a choice configuration where each
player’s choice is optimal given the choices of all other players
and so all rational commuters will converge into the new route
UD. With this new equilibrium, all participants will spend about
49min to reach the point End, with the paradoxical result of
increasing both congestion and travel time as it occures also
in other examples with different travel times (Rapoport et al.,
2009).
The Braess paradox has been object of interest for several
disciplines such as transportation science (Steinberg and
Zangwill, 1983), and computer science (Roughgarden, 2006).
Previous research on the Braess paradox reveals that it is a
common event rather than a rare one. For example, when
considering a large class of random networks, the probability
FIGURE 1 | Example of Braess paradox traffic network. (A) Basic network for groups of 8 subjects. (B) Augmented network for groups of 8 subjects.
of the paradox occurring is very high (Steinberg and Zangwill,
1983; Roughgarden, 2006). According to Gisches and Rapoport
(2012), in the last 40 years the Braess paradox was considered
a theoretical issue by many researchers. However, we can find
many empirical examples of the Braess paradox. Murchland
(1970) noticed that in the city of Stuttgart there were a series of
failed attempts to improve the traffic when adding new routes.
Youn et al. (2008) analyzed more than 200 roads in Boston and
found several examples of the Braess paradox. Similar findings
were observed by Kolata (1990) and Fisk and Pallottino (1981) in
the city of Winnipeg. Empirical examples of Braess paradox can
be found also in electricity (Pala et al., 2012), and team strategy
(Skinner, 2010).
3. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
BRAESS PARADOX: A SOCIAL DILEMMAS
PERSPECTIVE
According to Arnott and Small (1994), the Braess paradox
can be considered a type of social dilemma due to the
negative externalities derived by following selfish strategies.
Considering the Braess paradox as a social dilemma allows for
the investigation of social psychological factors to reduce the
damaging effects of structural changes in traffic networks. Social
dilemmas are pervasive and present in several aspects of our daily
life. For this reason, the study of cooperation in social dilemmas
is one of the most interesting issues for psychologists (Dawes,
1980), economists (Ostrom, 1998), and sociologists (Kollock,
1998). Communication, group-identity and self-efficacy are just
few examples of the variables considered to avoid the collective
disaster of social dilemmas (Liebrand, 1984; Brewer and Kramer,
1986; Komorita and Parks, 1996; De Cremer and Van Vugt,
1999). Research has also focused on factors such as reputation
(Wu et al., 2015), trust (Irwin et al., 2015), and punishment (Xiao
and Kunreuther, 2015).
Social dilemmas are mixed-motive interdependent situations
in which there is tension between individual rationality and
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collective welfare and can be classified in commons dilemmas
and public goods dilemmas (Dawes, 1980). In both situations,
the outcome for an individual depends on the decisions of
all parties involved. Commons dilemmas are situations where
individuals have the temptation to take more than their part of
a common source in the short-term, but if all individuals behave
selfishly this will lead to a collapse of the common good in the
long-term (Van Lange et al., 2013). In public goods dilemmas
the selfish temptation is to avoid the the short-term cost of
contributing to a collective good, which leads to the common
source not being provided in the long-term. According to Dawes
(1980), social dilemmas are characterized by two necessary
properties. The first is the presence of a dominant strategy,
while the second is the presence of a deficient equilibrium.
The presence of dominant strategy refers to situations in which
for every individual the payoff associated with the defective
choice is higher than the cooperative one, independently from
what the others decide (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). Since
the outcome related to the dominating equilibrium is less
than the cooperative one, this outcome is called deficient
equilibrium. In other words, ‘in social dilemmas each decision
maker is best off acting in his/her own self-interest, regardless
of what others do; yet, each self-interested decision creates a
negative outcome for all involved’ (Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996, p.
111).
In the Braess paradox, the route derived by the introduction
of the new link, UD, in the augmented network phase is
the dominant strategy, and the equilibrium reached is Pareto
dominated by the equilibrium of the basic network phase,
that is the one where individuals split equally between the
route Down and the route Up. For this reason, rather than
being a simultaneous game as is the prisoner’s dilemma, i.e.,
a game where cooperative or competitive dynamics depends
on the decisions made by individuals at the same time,
according to Rapoport et al. (2006) the Braess paradox can be
considered a structural dilemma because the negative effects
of individual rationality depend on structural network changes.
Furthermore, the augmented route is formed by the two links
that depend on congestion (Start-U and D-End). These links
are also part of the Up route (Start-U), and the Down route
(D-End). Therefore, a person who chooses the augmented
route increases the traffic of all commuters in the network.
Conversely, choosing one of the other routes increases the
traffic only in that route. For this reason, each participant
who avoids the augmented route is always helpful to the
collective.
In this context, in the Braess paradox individuals have
the possibility to experience a better outcome in the basic
network phase. Nevertheless, once introduced to the new route,
congestion and also individuals’ travel times increase. Therefore,
in the Braess paradox cooperation consists of avoiding the choice
of the new routeUD once it has been introduced. This is coherent
with the definition of cooperation in social dilemmas: the
behavior of an individual who acts against immediate individual
interest, but one that is beneficial to all if a sufficient fraction, or
the totality, of individuals adopt it (Boyer and Orléan, 1997).
4. THE RATIONALE OF THE STUDY
The Braess paradox has been revealed to be robust in lab
experiments evenwhen varying the number of commuters, roads,
number of turns played by participants, and also when reversing
the two phases of the game (Rapoport et al., 2009; Gisches
and Rapoport, 2012). These evidences suggest that reducing
this phenomenon may prove to be difficult. In fact, according
to Rapoport et al. (2006), in the Braess paradox variables as
tacit coordination, altruism, reciprocity and punishment are less
effective.
According to the interdependence theory (Van Lange and
Rusbult, 2011; Van Lange et al., 2013), in mixed motive
interdependent situations, choices depend on the interaction
of structural factors (e.g., the type of social dilemma, social
situation), psychological influences (motives, affects cognitive
aspects), and interaction dynamics (e.g., the strategies of other
partners).
In this study we present the Braess paradox as a paradigm
to test some factors used in social psychology literature. In
particular, we decided to manipulate factors that are recognized
to be structural solutions to social dilemmas (Kollock, 1998):
others’ choice, payoff information and distribution information.
In fact, these structural interventions are particularly suitable to
investigate some social processes.
Table 1 shows the design of the experiment. Below our main
hypotheses according to the design are briefly summarized.
4.1. Others’Choice
As discussed in Section 3, in the augmented network phase,
following the dominating equilibrium, i.e., the new route
introduced, increases traffic. We discussed that the previous
equilibria, i.e., the ones in the basic network phase, can be
compared to the cooperative strategy that has to be promoted
in other social dilemmas. We decided to investigate whether
playing with a cooperative population may reduce traffic.
Accordingly, a cooperative population is defined as a set of
preprogrammed individuals’ choices that—once introduced the
route UD-maintain the equilibria of the basic network phase.
Studies investigating the role of others’ choices in social
dilemmas show that a cooperative environment can likely be
exploited by individuals (Oskamp, 1971; Wilson, 1971; Patchen,
1987). However, there are cases in which conformity factors
enhance cooperation (Samuelson et al., 1984). We expect
that interacting with a cooperative population will increase
cooperation. In a recent study conducted by Parks et al. (2015),
two types of informationweremanipulated in order to investigate
TABLE 1 | The 8 conditions of the 2× 2× 2 design of the experiment.
Public distribution Private distribution
Cooperative Non-cooperative Cooperative Non-cooperative
Population population population population
Public payoff 1 2 3 4
Private payoff 5 6 7 8
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behavior in a commons dilemma. The Authors considered
environmental information, the information about the actual state
of the resource, and social information, the information about
what others choose and earn in each round of the game.We focus
on the social information factor by splitting it in two components:
one related on the simple information about what others choose,
i.e., distribution information, and one related on the payoff that
others obtain with their choices, i.e., payoff information.
4.2. Distribution Information
Others’ choice can be made salient by showing the information
on how the number of people opting for one route differ from
one another. As in a recent experiment on information in
resource dilemmas conducted by Parks et al. (2015), we want to
investigate whether knowing what others decided in the past can
influence individual behavior regardless of the personal interest.
Conformism has been revealed as a strong factor influencing
decision-making (Asch, 1951; Samuelson et al., 1984; Bardsley
and Sausgruber, 2005; Szolnoki and Perc, 2015). Moreover,
findings from social psychology (Joireman et al., 1997; Irwin and
Simpson, 2013; Van Lange et al., 2013) have widely demonstrated
that peers have a huge influence on individual decisions. In
our design, the highest activation of conformism processes is
expected when interacting with a cooperative population and
when the information about the distribution of others’ choices is
salient. The distribution information regards only the number of
subjects choosing one route over another. Therefore, according
to this social process, we expect that individuals will conform
with the choices of others and behave more cooperatively. We
will then compare these two hypotheses.
4.3. Payoff Information
If the distribution information makes individuals aware of what
the others decided in the past, payoff information makes the
outcomes obtained by each participants salient in every round.
As in the Braess paradox experiment participants accumulate
points by reducing the time taken to reach the point End, this
information can make clear how social (i.e., the number of
individuals related to a choice) and rational selfish calculations
(i.e., the payoff associated to each choice) can interact together in
this situation. According to Parks et al. (2015) the information
about others’ payoff increases concrete thinking about how
well participants are doing in comparison to others, and
this reasoning may decrease cooperation. The possibility of
a comparison between the personal payoff and others’ could
increase competitive behavior (McClintock and McNeel, 1966;
McNeel, 1973). Subjects have been given different kinds of
information about the payoff obtained in each trial: one group of
subjects was informed of others’ payoff whereas a different group
of subjects was informed of just their own payoff. In our point
of view, the manipulation of payoff information makes the role
of social comparison salient. Gisches and Rapoport (2012) found
no differences between private and public monitoring; their study
differs from ours in terms of the number of subjects (18) and trials
(120). The number of trials and group size have been revealed
an important factor enforcing the Braess paradox (Gisches and
Rapoport, 2012). Regarding the activation of social comparison
processes our aim is to understand whether comparison triggers
selfish choices. Research on cooperation in social dilemmas has
shown that individuals have particular concerns for fairness
(Van Lange, 1999; Stouten et al., 2005, 2009; Murphy et al., 2011).
Accordingly, we expect more competition in the public payoff
condition in comparison to the private payoff one: this is our
third hypothesis.
In summation, the manipulation of others’ choice allows us
to investigate the effect of interacting with different kinds of
players (cooperative vs. non-cooperative populations), payoff
information and distribution information have the ability to
make the role of social comparison and conformity salient.
To the best of our knowledge, the are no studies in which the
Braess paradox has been significantly reduced. In our opinion,
this study contributes to the social dilemmas literature by:
• investigating the role of social processes in improving
collective performance in the Braess paradox;
• proposing a new paradigm to promote cooperation in social
dilemmas.
5. MATERIALS AND METHODS
5.1. Participants
Our sample size depended on the guideline provided by Isaac
and Michael (1971) to have 30 participants for a pilot study, and
also on the suggestion to have around 10% of the total sample
size (Treece and Treece Jr, 1977). To extend this study, a power
analysis (Faul et al., 2007) suggests to have about 220 participants
per cell in order to detect a power of 0.08 with a medium effect
size and an α of 0.01.
A total of 151 Psychology and 109 Business administration
students (100 male and 160 female) from the University of Turin,
all aged between 18 and 21 years, were recruited in a 2 ×
2 × 2 between-subjects experiment. Participants were randomly
assigned to the 8 conditions.
5.2. Materials and Procedure
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of “Deontological Code of Italian
Psychologist” (see art.9) with written informed consent from all
subjects. We received written informed consent from all subjects
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Regarding the
ethics of our study we replicated the experimental design already
validated in the literature (Rapoport et al., 2009) in which no
ethical approval was requested. In fact, the participants were
asked to choose a route in a traffic situation without any implicit
inferences or psychological indirect measure. The data were
examined collectively in accordance with the declaration that
was written on the consensus that participants signed in order to
understand the aim of the study and the procedure of our data
analysis.
In this study, we ran our experiment using the computerized
experimental lab of the University of Turin with the software z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Data have been collected in a lab within
different computers in order to simulate a real interdependent
session of the game.
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Participants were seated in different cubicles and then they
read the instructions of the basic network phase (see Appendix
A). After the instructions, they were asked to answer some
comprehension questions followed by the first 8 rounds. After
each round, participants received feedback on their travel time
in reaching the point End. All feedback was different according
to the different manipulations (see the examples of different
manipulations in Appendix C from Tables C1–C4). In the public
payoff condition and public distribution condition participants
were aware of the travel times and distribution of choices of
all the other participants in their session, while in the private
payoff condition and private distribution condition they only read
their own payoff. The same procedure was followed for the
augmented network phase (see Appendix B). Each session was
conducted with groups of 8 subjects who were led to believe
they were playing together, while, actually their feedback was
predetermined according to the different others’ choice conditions
(see Appendix C in Tables C5–C7).
With the aim to trigger motivation, participants were
informed that the more points they earned the higher was their
probability to win 1 kg of chocolate in a lottery at the end of the
session. A lower time in reaching the point End, meant more the
points accumulated by individuals in each round (see Appendix
A for the formula on the accumulation of points). Although
economists and psychologists do not usually agree that incentives
improve performance in laboratory experiments (Gneezy and
Rustichini, 2000), according to Smith (1991) there is enough
evidence that incentives increase motivation. Subjects played 8
rounds in the first phase and 8 rounds in the second one.
Below we summarize the operationalization of the three
independent variables: Others’ choice (cooperative vs. non-
cooperative), Payoff information (public payoff vs. private
payoff) and Distribution information (public distribution vs.
no-distribution).
• Others’ choice. In our study participants were led to believe that
they were playing with a real group while, actually, they played
against fixed patterns of choices by other participants. A group
of subjects played with a cooperative population whereas
another group of subjects played with a non-cooperative
one. In the basic network phase, all subjects played with the
same kind of fictitious population with choices determined by
previous experiments. In the augmented network phase, each
participant could interact with two different types of artificial
populations: a cooperative and a non-cooperative population.
According to the definition of cooperation provided in
Section 3 with cooperative population we refer to a situation
in which nobody chooses the new route, while the non-
cooperative population condition choices were based on a
pre-test conducted with 37 participants playing a real session
of the Braess paradox, and on other real experiments with
human participants provided in literature (Dal Forno and
Merlone, 2013). To be more specific, this has been computed
as the mean of choices made for each turn in the experiments
conducted with real sessions of the Braess paradox. For this
reason, the non-cooperative population can be considered as a
control condition.
• Payoff information. In the public-payoff condition participants
were informed at each turn what they and others obtained. In
the private-payoff condition, participants just observed their
own payoff.
• Distribution information. In the distribution information
condition, participants had the possibility to see how decisions
are distributed among participants. To be more specific,
subjects in the public distribution information condition were
informed about the choices distribution of the other fictitious
participants in their group (e.g., 5 subjects chose Up and 3
subjects chose the route Down), whereas the other group was
not informed of the distribution information.
The dependent variable is cooperation. Cooperation is defined
as a lack of exploitation of the new route UD during the
8 rounds of augmented network phase. More specifically, it
has been measured considering the number of times in which
subjects chose to exploit the route UD. Therefore, cooperation
is associated with small values, and a small mean indicates a
cooperative tendency.
6. RESULTS
We conducted a 3-way ANOVA to test our hypothesis. Table 2
shows the mean and standard deviation for each condition. As
we can observe in Table 3, we have a main effect of payoff
information condition, an almost significant effect of others’
choice and three significant interaction effects. Considering the
payoff information, playing without the possibility of comparing
the proper travel times obtained with the others seems to decrease
the exploitation of the route, F(1,252) = 7.988 p= 0.005.
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics of the rate of route UD choices in the 8 conditions.
Others’ choice Payoff information Distribution information N Mean Standard Deviation
Cooperative Private Yes 39 5.333 2.286
No 30 5.600 2.127
Public Yes 29 6.206 1.952
No 32 4.718 2.358
Non-Cooperative Private Yes 39 3.538 1.903
No 30 4.866 1.306
Public Yes 29 5.448 1.938
No 32 6.000 2.918
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6.1. Interactions
The payoff and distribution information interaction presented
in Figure 2A, shows that when payoff is public, the information
about others choices undermines cooperation. Conversely, when
payoff information is private, the distribution of information
increases cooperation: this is coherent with the idea that once
individuals have no information on their outcomes, they rely
on the behavior of others (Molleman et al., 2014; Parks et al.,
2015). Looking at the cooperativeness of others’ choice and payoff
information (Figure 2B), the positive effect on cooperation of
the private payoff condition can be observed when interacting
with a non-cooperative population but seems to have no effect
with a cooperative one. This can be due to the fact that when
people select the UD choice in the cooperative population, the
favourable outcome related to this choice does not provide
reasons for people to change their route. Finally, regarding the
distribution of choice in comparison with the cooperativeness
TABLE 3 | Summary of the main results of a 3-way ANOVA.
F p η2p
Others’ choice 3.487 0.060 0.014
Payoff information 7.998 0.005∗ 0.031
Distribution information 0.376 0.540 0.001
Distribution information × Others’ choice 8.339 0.004∗ 0.032
Distribution information × Payoff information 5.555 0.019∗ 0.022
Payoff information × Others’ choice 8.069 0.005∗ 0.031
Distribution information × Payoff information ×
Others’choice
0.830 0.363 0.003
Significant difference considering α = 0.01.
of a population (Figure 2C), public distribution information
enhances the exploitation of the UD route. This can be due to
the fact that the cooperative population, see Table C6, makes
public that no one choose the new route and therefore this
provides more opportunities to earn points by behaving selfishly.
Accordingly, this explanation can be used to explain the opposite
trend when interacting with a non-cooperative population. As in
this situation the majority of individuals chooses the route UD,
individuals try to earnmore points choosing the other routes, i.e.,
Down and Up.
7. DISCUSSION
In our study, we presented a traffic network based on a
commons dilemma known as the Braess paradox and tried to
reduce the exploitative behavior by making some crucial social
processes salient. The most relevant finding of our investigation
was the effect of private monitoring in minimizing the use
of the newly introduced route: incomplete information about
payoff seemed to be effective in reducing selfish behavior in
the Braess paradox. Therefore, information on others’ behavior
can undermine cooperation in traffic networks dilemmas. This
result replicates the findings found by Parks et al. (2015) in a
resource dilemma. According to Stouten et al. (2009), a possible
explanation for this effect is that when individuals are aware of
asymmetric distribution of resources, they tend to apply fairness
rules to fill the gap (distributive justice). Moreover, the presence
of some individuals regretting unfair distribution of resources is
suggested by recent research on Social Value Orientation (SVO)
(Murphy et al., 2011). In fact, according to Murphy et al. (2011),
inequality aversion leads individuals to reach fairness, even if
this fairness decreases the collective welfare. Our results are
FIGURE 2 | Interactions among the experimental conditions. (A) Payoff and distribution information interaction. (B) Others’ choice and payoff information
interaction. (C) Others’ choice and distribution information interaction.
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also coherent with the model of inequality aversion provided
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). According to the authors, people
may exhibit a preference for equal distributions. They argue that
agents with fairness considerations tend to punish those who are
perceived as the cause of an unequal distribution of resources.
Therefore, according to this model, in the public payoff condition
a participant may choose the augmented route to reduce the
difference between his/her outcome and the one of the other
participants.
Following the suggestion given in Parks et al. (2015), we
addressed the role of cooperativeness of others’ choice in this
incomplete information scenario. In this study we address this
point and our results suggest that interacting with a cooperative
population seems to enhance competitive decisions rather than
cooperative ones. This result provides more support for the
rational individual perspective suggesting that in situations
in which individuals can obtain the maximum payoff, social
processes such as conformity do not work. The distribution
information seems to have no relevance on cooperative choices
in the Braess paradox. According to Irwin and Simpson (2013),
others’ choice also have an important influence in cases where it
is clear that the majority choice is wrong. Following these lines,
we believed that distribution information could play a role in
the cooperative population condition because in such a fictitious
population no one was programmed to use the route UD. This
kind of findings provide robustness of the rationality explanation
in social dilemmas and for the phenomenon of Braess paradox.
Accordingly, these results provide support to the literature on
evolutionary game theory suggesting that when we introduce
defectors in a cooperative population, the latter population will
likely be exploited (see Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Perc and Szolnoki,
2010; Wang et al., 2015).
Finally, it seems that individuals can be guided by both
rational and social factors according to the condition they are
immersed in Kelley and Thibaut (1978). This is an interesting
insight because individuals are not seen as exclusively rational or
situation-dependent but rather as individuals acting differently
according the situation and social context in which they are
immersed. As this represents a pilot study, an important limit
represents the power of the significant results and interpretation
of null findings. It is possible that with increasing the sample
size the effect of payoff information may diminish, showing for
example that social influence has a minor role in the Braess
Paradox.
Future research on social dilemmasmay focus on other factors
involved in decisions, taking into account both structural and
psychological aspects. From our point of view, following these
lines could be an effective strategy to promote cooperation
in social dilemmas, and a possible way to shed light on the
processes involved in decision-making. To be more specific,
the findings of our study are related to situations in which
the number of both subjects and turns is limited. In further
research, it may be noteworthy to focus on generalizing these
results to different group-sizes and to a larger number of
turns in order to understand the extent of the social factors
examined. Another possibility for advancement could be the
analysis of the role of other psychological factors as group-
identity in minimizing selfish decisions or exploring more
deeply the fairness explanation by introducing punishment or
by investigating individual differences in terms of social value
orientations.
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APPENDIX
A. Instructions Basic Network Phase
• Imagine you are a commuter who must travel every day from
Start to End. You can choose two possible routes: one is the
Up road and the other one is the Down road.
• Your goal is to reach End in the shortest possible time.
• Down road and Up road consist both of two segments: for the
first one travel time is always 28 min, and for the other one it
depends on the traffic congestion in the route.
• Let P be the number of commuters who will be on the route at
the same time.
If you choose the Up route, the section from Start to U
has a travel cost of 24/P min times every commuters in that
section; the section from U to End has a constant travel time
of 28 min.
• If you choose the Down route, the section from Start to D
takes a constant travel cost of 28 min and the section fromD to
End takes a travel time of 24/P multiplied by every commuter
in that section.
• You will accumulate points depending on how much time you
have saved: Your travel time−502 .
• You cannot communicate with other participants
B. Instructions Augmented Network Phase
• A bridge with a constant travel time of 1 min has been built
from U to D. You have now another way to reach End from
Start. The new choice UD consists of three parts, the first
segment of the route Start to U,U to D, and the second
segment of D to End . The travel costs of other choices, Up
and Down, remain the same as in the Basic Phase.
• You goal is to reach End in the shortest possible time.
C. Example of Different Conditions and
Artificial Population
Table C1 | Feedback example of public payoff condition and public
distribution condition.
Your decision Down
Travel time of participants who chose Up 37
Travel time of participants who chose Down 43
Number of Players choosing Up 3
Number of Players choosing Down 5
Table C2 | Feedback example of public payoff condition and private
distribution condition.
Your decision Down
Travel time of participants who chose Up 37
Travel time of participants who chose Down 43
Table C3 | Feedback example of private payoff condition and public
distribution condition.
Your decision Down
Your travel time 37
Number of Players choosing Up 3
Number of Players choosing Down 5
Table C4 | Feedback example of private payoff condition and private
distribution condition.
Your decision Down
Your travel time 37
Table C5 | Preprogrammed agents in the basic network phase.
Rounds Down Up
Round 1 4 3
Round 2 4 3
Round 3 5 2
Round 4 3 4
Round 5 2 5
Round 6 4 3
Round 7 4 3
Round 8 3 4
Table C6 | Cooperative artificial population in the augmented network
phase.
Rounds Down UD Up
Round 9 2 0 5
Round 10 3 0 4
Round 11 3 0 4
Round 12 3 0 4
Round 13 5 0 2
Round 14 5 0 2
Round 15 4 0 3
Round 16 3 0 4
Table C7 | Competitive (Baseline condition) artificial population in the
aumented network phase.
Rounds Down UD Up
Round 9 2 3 2
Round 10 2 4 1
Round 11 0 5 2
Round 12 1 6 0
Round 13 1 6 0
Round 14 1 6 0
Round 15 1 6 0
Round 16 1 6 0
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